In a stylized model involving two agents -a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-holder -we analyze how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's patent protection policy. We show that if the South is free to deny patent protection, not only does CL fail to arise in equilibrium, the option to use it makes both parties worse o¤. Furthermore, being able to use CL reduces the South's incentive for patent protection. However, if the South is obligated to o¤er patent protection (say due to its membership in an international organization such as the WTO), CL occurs in equilibrium and can even make both parties better o¤. CL is more likely to occur if price is negotiated between the two parties compared to when it is set unilaterally by the patentholder. If the South can impose a price control, the patent-holder is willing to sell at a lower price if its patent is protected relative to when it is not. Thus, the ability to dictate price makes patent protection more attractive to the South while the option to use CL has the opposite e¤ect.
Introduction
The rati…cation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was a watershed event in the history of the multilateral trading system. The expansion of the WTO into the sensitive realm of intellectual property had profound implications for both developed and developing countries: post TRIPS, international violations of intellectual property rights (IPRs) can be subject to the potent dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. 1 It is no secret that, prior to TRIPS, imitation and piracy of products protected in the West by copyrights, trademarks, and patents -such as DVDs, designer consumer items, software, and pharmaceuticals -was pervasive in the developing world. Indeed, even today most developing countries capable of successfully imitating such products see few advantages, if any, to restricting local imitation and reverse-engineering.
On the other side of the spectrum, developed countries generally argue for stronger IPRs world-wide in order to ensure that holders of IPRs (most of whom reside in the developed world) can pro…t adequately from their creative e¤orts and investments in research and development (R&D). 2 Indeed, TRIPS negotiations during the Uruguay Round (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) were motivated by a deep-rooted sense of dissatisfaction in the United States and major European nations with the lack of IPR protection in major developing countries such as Brazil, India, and China.
WTO members can permit the "use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties", or what is commonly referred to as the compulsory licensing (CL) of a patent. 5 CL was not a TRIPS innovation. Indeed, CL was explicitly recognized in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, …rst rati…ed in 1883 and then amended several times up until 1979. 6 However, actual incidents of CL in the international context have started to emerge only during the post-TRIPS era. Indeed, during 1995-2011 there were 24 "episodes" of CL of patented foreign medicines (Beall and Kuhn, 2012) . 7 By contrast, during the pre-TRIPS era, we observed very little, if any, such international episodes of CL. 8 In a fundamental sense, the lack of CL prior to 1995 is linked to the virtual absence of IPR protection in most developing countries during the pre-TRIPS era: after all, the issuance of a compulsory license is premised on the legal recognition of a patent. If the patent itself is not protected, there is essentially nothing to license. With developing countries increasingly coming under pressure to strengthen their IPR regimes, a greater role for CL as a tool for improving consumer access to patented products in such countries should have naturally emerged during the post-TRIPS era.
As an illustration of the implications of TRIPS for developing countries, consider the case of India's pharmaceutical industry. Prior to TRIPS, Indian patent law did not recognize product patents in pharmaceuticals; only process innovations were a¤orded protection and these too were protected only for seven years. As a result, Indian entrepreneurs and …rms were free to reverse-engineer and imitate pharmaceuticals that were patented in rest of the world. It is widely acknowledged that the skewed nature of India's 5 The other major TRIPS ‡exibility (that we do not analyze here) is specifed in Article 6 which states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights." The economic implications of the freedom that WTO members have to implement exhaustion policies of their choice have been widely studied. See, for example, Malueg and Schwarz (1994) , Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) , Valleti (2006) , and Roy and Saggi (2012) . 6 Article II of TRIPS says that "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention" and Article 5(2) of the Paris Convention says that "Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work." See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?…le_id=288514#P213_35515. 7 Beall and Kuhn (2012) de…ned a CL episode to be one where CL was explcitly and publicly discussed between government o¢ cials of a country and foreign patent-holders (although it need not have been the end result of such negotiations). 8 The limited use of CL by developing countries during the pre-TRIPS era likely re ‡ects another aspect of WTO rules pertaining to CL: prior to 2001 a country could only issue a compulsory license to a local producer, requirement that essentially made CL inaccessible to many technologically backward countries. This local production requirement was loosened by the WTO in 2003 by allowing the import of necessary pharmaceuticals via compulsory licenses issued to …rms in other countries. patent regime during the pre-TRIPS era generated signi…cant bene…ts for not just Indian consumers but also for consumers in many other countries since India became a cheap source of pharmaceuticals for the developing world. 9 However, to become TRIPS compliant, India was forced to reform its intellectual property law and introduced product patents for pharmaceuticals for the …rst time in 2005. 10 A recent press article (Chatterjee and Hirschler, Feb 6, 2014) reports that faced with increasing pressure from global pharmaceutical companies to put an end to ongoing imitation of patented drugs, the Indian government is currently reviewing whether compulsory licenses and more stringent price controls should be used to bring down the prices of patented foreign drugs.
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With imitation becoming increasingly di¢ cult to sustain during the post-TRIPS era, CL has naturally become more attractive to developing countries as means for ensuring access to patented products at low prices. In this paper, we develop a simple model that captures this insight and use it to evaluate the costs and bene…ts of CL as well as those of strengthening patent protection in developing countries. Our stylized model involves two parties: a developing country (called South) and a Northern …rm who owns a patent over its product that lasts for T periods. In the …rst period, the South chooses whether or not to protect the patent-holder from imitation while the patent-holder decides whether or not to enter the Southern market. If the South protects the patent and the patent-holder chooses not to enter in the …rst period, for the remaining duration (T 1 periods) of the patent the South has the authority to issue a compulsory license to a local producer who is required to set price equal to marginal cost. 12 If the South does not protect the patent, a competitive local industry producing an imitated version of the patented good comes into existence. Due to the limited technological capability of the South, the quality of production under imitation (as well as CL) is lower than that of the patent-holder. 13 9 For supporting empirical evidence regarding the e¤ects of patent protection and price controls on the entry incentives of pharmaceutical companies and on the welfare of consumers in developing countries (especially India), see Lanjouw (1998 10 Similarly, patent protection was strengthened in China in 1997 and in Brazil during 2002. As per the popular Ginarte-Park index of patent protection (see Park 2008) TRIPS induced major changes in the degree of patent protection in India and China: the value of the index for India increased sharply from 1.03 in 1995 to 3.76 in 2005 while that for China almost doubled from 2.12 to 4.08 over the same time period. We thank Walter Park for providing us the most updated version of this index. 11 In 2012, frictions between India and the pharmaceutical company Bayer ‡ared up when India decided to issue a compulsory license for Bayer's cancer drug Nexavar. Bayer challenged the compulsory license in Indian courts but was unsuccessful in getting it over turned. More recently, the National Pharmaceutical and Pricing Authority of India has expanded the list of medicines subject to price controls by imposing new controls on the anti-diabetes and cardiovascular segments of the pharmaceutical market (see Dey, Business Standard, October 24, 2014). 12 The qualitative nature of our results is una¤ected by allowing for an arbitrary delay period before a CL can be issued by the South. 13 Bond and Saggi (2014a) provide an extensive discussion of the problems that developing countries
If the patent-holder chooses to enter despite the lack of patent protection, it competes with the imitative industry -an outcome under which Southern consumers enjoy the highest surplus due to greater variety and competition in the local market.
We …rst analyze a benchmark scenario similar to Saggi (2013) where the option to use CL does not exist. This benchmark model delivers an interesting insight: the South grants patent protection i¤ doing so is necessary to induce the patent-holder to sell locally and the quality of local production under imitation is quite low. Thus, both the size of the local market (relative to the …xed cost of entry) and the technological capability of the local economy determine Southern incentives for patent protection. The South lacks the incentive to o¤er patent protection both when its local market is lucrative for the patent-holder as well as when it is too small to induce entry. Similarly, if local imitation is of su¢ ciently high quality, the South has little to gain from patent protection.
14 In order to draw out the implications of TRIPS, we also identify circumstances under which forcing the South to o¤er patent protection increases or decreases joint welfare in the benchmark model.
We next build on the benchmark model to incorporate CL. In accordance with WTO rules which require that a patent-holder be given an opportunity to work its patent before a CL can be issued, we assume that the South can invoke CL only if the patent-holder does not sell the South in the …rst period. We show that the option to use CL reduces the South's willingness to o¤er patent protection, i.e., there exist parameter regions under which the South o¤ers patent protection only if CL is unavailable. The intuition for this result follows from a two-step logic. First, the royalties involved under CL increase the patent-holder's payo¤ from not entering the South (and letting CL occur). Second, imitation dominates CL from the Southern viewpoint since it does not incur royalties and also avoids the (one-period) delay involved under CL. As a result, whenever the patent-holder prefers CL to entry, the South chooses not to o¤er patent protection since it prefers imitation to CL.
In the model, the patent-holder has too weak an incentive to enter since it ignores the bene…ts of its entry to Southern consumers while the Southern government has have in implementing CL. In particular, they note that the available case-study evidence shows that even countries such as Brazil and Thailand have found it di¢ cult to produce world class products under CL. See also Baron (2008) and Daemmrich and Musacchio (2011) for further discussion.
14 Our model suggests a non-monotonic relationship between a country's level of development and its degree of patent protection. Countries that are poor imitators have incentives to o¤er patent protection in order to obtain access to high quality foreign products. Countries that can imitate well but are not yet competitive in innovation, will prefer not to o¤er patent protection since doing so transfers local consumer surplus to foreign patent-holders without inducing much in the way of local innovation. Finally, countries with the ability to innovate will choose to provide patent protection. Evidence of a U-shaped relationship between per capita GDP and the strength of intellectual property rights, as suggested by our results, is reported by Maskus (2000) and Chen and Puttitanun (2005) .
an inadequate incentive for patent protection because it does not take into account the pro…tability of the patent-holder. These twin distortions imply that there exist circumstances where the patent-holder stays out but entry is socially e¢ cient just as there are cases where the South should o¤er patent protection but it does not. However, from a joint welfare perspective, the South never o¤ers patent protection when it should not do so. Thus, if the South is free to deny patent protection, not only does CL fail to arise in equilibrium, the option to use it makes both parties worse o¤ since the possibility of CL further reduces the South's incentive to o¤er patent protection thereby undermining the patent-holder's incentive to enter.
We also consider the consequences of requiring the South to implement patent protection (i.e. shutting down local imitation) when CL is an available option. As expected, such forced patent protection bene…ts the patent-holder at the expense of the South. However, more interestingly, CL now emerges as an equilibrium outcome. This result formally con…rms the insight that with imitation becoming di¢ cult, developing countries have an incentive to turn towards CL as a means for accessing patented products at low prices. Furthermore, we also identify circumstances where joint welfare of the two parties decreases (as well as when it increases) due to the shutting down of Southern imitation. As in Bond and Saggi (2014a), we …nd that given patent protection, the option to use CL can even make both parties better o¤.
Since patent-holders may be unable to exercise unrestricted monopoly power in developing countries due to government intervention, we extend the model to allow for price negotiations between the patent-holder and the South. We …nd that if the patent-holder can make it a take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er to the South, incorporating price negotiations does not alter the South's optimal patent protection policy. But price negotiations do matter in an important sense: given that the South o¤ers patent protection, CL is more likely to arise in equilibrium when the two parties negotiate over price relative to when the patent-holder sets it unilaterally.
We also show that if the South has the ability to control the price, the patent-holder is willing to sell in its market at a lower price when it receives patent protection relative to when it does not. This result implies that the strengthening of patent protection should make it possible for developing countries to tighten their price controls on foreign patentholders as opposed to having to weaken them. Furthermore, while the ability to dictate price makes patent protection more attractive to the South, the option to use CL makes it less so. Thus, while both CL and price controls can help improve consumer access in developing countries to patented foreign products (such as pharmaceuticals), the two instruments have rather di¤erent a¤ects on their incentives to protect foreign patents.
Benchmark model
We study the decision of a patent-holder regarding entry into a developing country (South) where its technology is potentially subject to imitation. The benchmark model is a two stage game between the patent-holder and the South. In the …rst stage, the South chooses whether or not to allow imitation (denoted by subscript I), where imitation generates local competition for the patent-holder. Next, the patent-holder decides whether to enter the South by incurring the …xed cost '. 15 Later, we extend this model by adding a third stage at which the South can issue a compulsory license to a local …rm in order to ensure that the patented good is supplied locally. As per WTO rules, we assume that the South has the authority to issue a compulsory license only if the patent-holder chooses not to sell in its market.
Demand and payo¤s
There are a continuum of Southern consumers of measure 1, each of whom buys (at most) one unit of the product. If a consumer buys the product at price p, his utility is given by U = q p where q measures quality and 0 is a taste parameter that captures the willingness to pay for quality. For simplicity, we assume that is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1].
The patent-holder's patent lasts for T periods provided it is protected by the South. Let 2 [0; 1) be the per period discount factor and let the marginal cost of production equal zero. Normalizing utility under no purchase to zero, the per-period demand d(p; q) in the South for the patented product in the absence of imitation equals d(p; q) = 1 p=q. Over the life of the patent, in each period the patent-holder chooses its price p to maximize
The present value of the patent-holder's entry pro…ts (gross of …xed costs) as a function of its price p equals
15 Any …xed costs involved under local production (either via CL or imitation) are normalized to zero. The parameter ' should be interpreted as the additional …xed costs that are faced by the patent-holder relative to local producers. Such additional costs could arise from not just production activities but also from having to secure approval from the local government prior to selling locally and/or from having to establish a marketing and distribution network in an unfamiliar environment.
The per-period consumer surplus that accrues to the South from purchasing the patented product at price p equals
which implies that Southern welfare over the duration of the patent under entry at price p equals w
Solving the problem in (1) yields the patent-holder's optimal monopoly price p m = q=2. Thus, the maximized payo¤ from entry to the patent-holder when its patent is protected equals
while that to the South equals
When the South does not protect the patent-holder's patent, imitation results in the emergence of a competitive industry that produces a lower quality version of the patented product. Quality of the Southern imitation is denoted by q where 0 < 1. Southern consumers are assumed to have complete information in the sense that they can fully distinguish between the original patented product and the imitative version produced by the local industry. 16 Competition within the Southern industry ensures that the imitated good is sold at marginal cost. When two di¤erent qualities are available for purchase at prices p (high quality) and 0 (low quality), Southern consumers can be partitioned into two groups: those in the range [0; h (p; ) buy the low quality whereas those in [ h (p; ); 1] buy the high quality where
When facing competition from imitation, the patent-holder chooses its price p to maximize
16 It is worth emphasizing that in the context of the pharmaceutical industry the imitated product is best viewed as a generic that can only be sold in the South. The quality di¤erential between the two products then represents the value consumers associate with the brand of the patent-holder. = 1=2. Thus, competition from imitation lowers the patent-holder's gross entry payo¤ to
where 1.
If the South permits imitation and the patent-holder does not enter then local consumers obtain access (only) to the lower quality imitated good at a price equal to marginal cost (set to zero). Under this scenario, Southern welfare equals
However, if the patent-holder enters the Southern market despite imitation, Southern welfare equals
Note that w
Thus, provided the patent-holder enters, Southern welfare increases due to imitation. When the South permits imitation, those Southern consumers that are unwilling to pay the price for the higher quality product sold by the patent-holder gain access to a lower quality version that sells at a lower price. This variety enhancing e¤ect of imitation is one reason the South bene…ts from imitation. The second reason, of course, is that the imitated product competes with the patented product and this competition lowers the price of the high quality.
In the absence of competition form imitation, in equilibrium, only half of the market in the South is covered since h (p m ) = p m =q = 1=2. By contrast, when imitation occurs, all those consumers that buy the high quality in the absence of imitation continue to do so although they now pay a lower price for it. In addition, all consumer in the range [0; 1=2] end up buying the low quality imitative good so that the entire Southern market ends up being covered when the South permits imitation.
Equilibrium
The patent-holder's entry decision depends upon the South's policy regarding patent protection. Given patent protection, the patent-holder sells in the South i¤
Similarly, when facing imitation, the patent-holder chooses to enter i¤
Since ' I ' E , the lack of patent protection makes the patent-holder less willing to sell in the South.
Consider now the South's decision regarding patent protection. Suppose the South protects the patent-holder. Then, if ' ' E the patent-holder enters and Southern welfare equals w When ' < ' I , the patent-holder's …xed entry cost is so low that it enters the market even if imitation occurs in the South. Given that, shutting down imitation simply lowers local consumer surplus by reducing competition and variety. When ' > ' E , the patent-holder's …xed entry cost is so high that it does not sell in the South even when its patent is protected. In such a scenario, the South clearly has no incentive to grant patent protection since doing so eliminates even the low quality version of the patented product from the local market. Now consider the more interesting case where ' I < ' ' E . Here, the Southern policy matters to the patent-holder: it enters the Southern market i¤ the South o¤ers patent protection. Under such a situation, the South faces a trade-o¤: imitation provides consumers access to the low quality product while simultaneously denying access to the high quality. As a result, the South's decision is determined by the quality gap (1= ) between products. When this gap is large (i.e. S ) , the South o¤ers patent protection; when it is small, it does not. Thus, the main insight behind Proposition 1 is that the South grants patent protection i¤ such protection is necessary to induce the patent-holder to sell locally and the quality of local production under imitation is quite low so that shutting down local imitation to ensure access to the high quality product becomes welfare-improving. Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. Only in region B that is de…ned by the horizontal line (that plots ' E ), the downward sloping line (that plots ' I ), and the dashed line (that shows S ) does the South chooses to o¤er patent protection to induce entry. Everywhere else, the South allows imitation. Below the downward sloping line (region A), the patent-holder enters even though imitation is permitted whereas above the horizontal line (region D) it does not even if it is prohibited.
[ Figure 1 here]
To investigate the welfare properties of the equilibrium, de…ne the joint welfare of the two parties as the sum of their individual welfare levels. One basic property of the model is that the patent-holder's decision-making fails to take into account the surplus its entry generates for Southern consumers. Thus, in general, its incentive to enter the South is too weak from the perspective of joint welfare of the two parties. On the other hand, the Southern government's decision regarding patent protection does not take into account the welfare of the patent-holder. As a result, the South's incentive for patent protection is weaker than what joint optimality requires. The tension between these two distortions drives the welfare analysis that follows.
Given that the South o¤ers patent protection, joint welfare under entry equals
Given patent protection, if the patent holder does not enter (which it does not whenever ' > ' E ), the welfare of each party equals zero. Therefore, entry is jointly optimal i¤
where ' m E > ' E which re ‡ects the fact that the patent-holder ignores local consumer surplus. Through-out the paper we assume that ' < ' m E .
Similarly, we have
Given that the patent-holder enters, imitation raises joint welfare by generating competition and increasing variety:
Thus, for all ' < ' I , the South's decision to not o¤er patent protection is socially optimal (even though it makes the patent-holder worse o¤).
It is clear that whenever the South chooses to o¤er patent protection (i.e. for ' I < ' ' E and < S ), it is jointly optimal do so. However, there are instances where the South should o¤er patent protection but it fails to do so. Using
i.e. given imitation, entry raises joint welfare i¤ ' ' w I .
Next note that
i.e. joint welfare is higher if only the high quality product is sold at the monopoly price relative to when only the imitated good is available at the competitive price so long as the …xed cost of entry lies below ' w E . Observe that if 3=4 then it can never be jointly optimal to o¤er patent protection to induce entry. Here, the quality disadvantage of imitated production is rather small and allowing imitation to occur is jointly e¢ cient even if it induces the patent-holder to stay out of the South.
A welfare comparison of the various outcomes is as follows:
To gain further insight into the welfare properties of the equilibrium of the benchmark model, it is useful to consider a comparison of the various cost thresholds that determine the social desirability of each regime vis-à-vis those that determine the South's equilibrium decision:
Using this lemma and Proposition 2 we can conclude the following. First, as noted earlier, the South's decision to deny patent protection is jointly optimal for all ' 2 [0; ' I ] (region A in Figure 2 ) as well as for ' > ' E (region D). For parameters in region A, the outcome is socially optimal because the patent-holder enters even though the South does not o¤er patent protection; for parameters in region D, the patent-holder would not enter the South even if its patent were protected which makes it socially optimal for the South to not protect it. Second, for ' 2 [' I ; ' E ] and < S (region B in Figure 2 ), patent protection is socially optimal and the South chooses to o¤er it. Here, even though the patent-holder acts as a monopolist, its quality advantage over Southern imitators (if allowed to operate) is so large that it is optimal to restrict competition from imitation. Third, for ' 2 [' I ; ' Figure 2 ), the South chooses not to give patent protection even though it is jointly optimal to do so. Here, from the South's perspective, the technological superiority of the patent-holder is outweighed by the cost to the Southern consumers of allowing it monopoly power. But taking account of the pro…ts earned by the patent-holder (which the South ignores) tips the balance in favor of patent protection. Fourth, for maxf' I ; ' w E ] < ' < ' E and (region C2 in Figure 2) , the South's decision to deny patent protection is again optimal. Here, the quality of the imitated product is high enough to render monopoly pricing for the patented product socially suboptimal and the costs of entry are low enough that the patent-holder enters despite imitation.
[ Figure 2 here]
We now extend the benchmark model study the interaction between the South's incentive for patent protection and its ability to use compulsory licensing.
Model with compulsory licensing
In the benchmark model, if the patent-holder does not enter and the South lacks the freedom to allow imitation then local consumers have no means for accessing the product. As noted earlier, WTO rules permit the issuance of a compulsory license if a patentholder chooses not to work its patent locally. Accordingly, we now extend the model to include a third stage where the South decides whether or not to grant a compulsory license. If the product has not been sold in the market in the …rst period, the South can issue a compulsory license to a local …rm who pays the per-period royalty R to the patent-holder for the duration of the patent. The royalty fee R re ‡ects the TRIPS requirement of a "adequate remuneration"to the patent-holder.
Under CL, the Southern government requires the local …rm to set price equal to marginal cost (in order to maximize local consumer surplus). 17 Furthermore, as under imitation, the quality of production under CL equals q, where < 1 captures the quality disadvantage of CL. Thus, in terms of the product market, the outcome under CL mirrors imitation in our model.
A compulsory license granted at stage three provides the licensee with the right to produce the good for T 1 periods. With these assumptions, the welfare of the South under a compulsory license equals:
CL is a credible threat for w
Thus, CL is a credible threat so long as the quality of licensed production is not so low that the total surplus generated for Southern consumers is insu¢ cient to cover the royalty R paid to the patent-holder.
How CL changes the equilibrium
When making its entry decision the patent-holder now takes the possibility of CL into account. If given patent protection by the South, the patent-holder has to decide whether to (a) incur the …xed cost ' and collect the payo¤ v E (p m ) or (b) to not enter and wait for CL to occur in the next period under which its payo¤ is R. The patent-holder prefers entry to CL i¤
Thus, the patent-holder chooses entry for all ' ' E (R) whereas it waits for CL if
i.e., the possibility of CL makes the patent-holder less willing to enter the Southern market by allowing it to collect royalty payments for the duration of the compulsory license if it chooses to stay out. Observe also that '
As before, if imitation is allowed by the South, the patent-holder's payo¤ from entry falls to (1 )v E (p m ) '. Furthermore, since imitation precludes CL, the patentholder's decision becomes trivial: it prefers entry to staying out i¤ ' ' I . Foreseeing the patent-holder's decision, the South sets the following patent protection policy:
Proposition 3: When compulsory licensing is an available option, the South chooses to extend patent protection i¤ (i) ' I < ' ' E (R) and (ii) S .
Observe that for R > 0, ' E (R) < ' E : given that CL yields a strictly positive royalty payment to the patent-holder, the South is less willing to o¤er patent protection when it has the option to use CL. More speci…cally, over the parameter region maxf' E (R); ' I g < ' < ' E (the shaded region B1 in Figure 3 ) the option to use CL leads the South to not o¤er patent protection since, over this set of parameter values, the patent-holder would prefer to stay out to collect royalties under CL even if it is protected from imitation. It is important to note that though CL does not arise in equilibrium, by raising the patentholder's payo¤ from staying out the possibility of CL increases the likelihood that the South denies patent protection.
[ Figure 3 here]
Welfare e¤ects of CL
How does the option of CL a¤ect the two parties? The result here is surprising and clear:
Proposition 4: Given that the South is free to allow imitation, not only does CL fail to arise in equilibrium but the option to use CL makes both parties worse o¤.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. We noted above that when maxf' E (R); ' I g < ' < ' E and S the possibility of CL induces the South to not o¤er patent protection since, for this set of parameter values, the patent-holder prefers to stay out of the South in order to collect royalty payments under CL if its patent is protected. This, in turn, makes patent protection counter-productive for the South: since Southern welfare under imitation dominates that under CL (due to the delay involved and the royalties incurred), the South is better o¤ permitting imitation to preclude CL. But the important point is that for this set of parameter values, the South is actually better o¤ if only the patented product were to be sold in its market since the local industry's product is of fairly low quality ( S ). Similarly, the patent-holder is strictly better o¤ under entry since v E (p m ) > ' for ' < ' E . It follows then that if imitation is possible then a credible commitment on the part of the South to not use CL makes both parties better o¤ when maxf' E (R); ' I g < ' < ' E and S . As we shall see below, the option to use CL can never make both parties worse o¤ if the South cannot allow local imitation.
If South must o¤er patent protection
What are the consequences of forcing the South to o¤er patent protection, say due to an international agreement such as TRIPS? When imitation is not permitted, the patent-holder chooses entry for all ' ' E (R) whereas it waits for CL to occur when ' > ' E (R). 18 Both parties strictly lose when maxf' E (R); ' I g < ' < ' E and S whereas they are una¤ected otherwise.
If ' > maxf' E (R); ' I g, (regions B1, C3, and D in Figure 4 ) in the absence of TRIPS, the South permits imitation whereas the patent-holder stays out of the South. Shutting down imitation converts the market outcome from one where a competitive local industry supplies the low quality product to one where the same product is supplied by the local licensee (at price equal to marginal cost) under CL. While the price and quality under CL and imitation are the same, CL occurs with delay since, as per WTO rules, the South is required to gave the patent-holder a chance to work its patent. Furthermore, the South has to pay royalties under CL whereas it does not compensate the patentholder under imitation. The delay involved under CL and the compensation paid to the patent-holder make the South worse o¤. The patent-holder obviously bene…ts: absent CL, it stays out and collects no pro…t from the Southern market.
Next consider the parameter range where ' E (R) < ' < ' I (region A1 in Figure 4 ). Over this range, in the absence of TRIPS, the patent-holder enters the South despite the fact that South permits imitation. With TRIPS in place, the patent-holder chooses to stay out and wait for CL to occur since the value of royalty payments under CL exceeds its payo¤ under entry (even though entry is pro…table in an absolute sense). When this happens, the South loses because the high quality product is eliminated from the market (i.e. variety declines). It is worth noting here that for ' E (R) < ' < ' I it is patent protection that induces the patent-holder to stay out of the Southern market, as opposed to the lack of such protection. This happens because the payo¤ under CL to the patent-holder exceeds that under entry even though it chooses to enter when patent protection is missing. The key insight is that when the South does not o¤er patent protection, the option of CL is automatically taken o¤ the table since imitation makes CL redundant from the Southern viewpoint. Indeed, patent protection is a necessary precondition for CL: once a patent has been violated (via imitation), CL is no longer an option.
Over the range ' I < ' < ' E (R) the consequences of requiring South to extend patent protection depend upon whether or not S . When this inequality holds (i.e. region B2 in Figure 4 ), local production su¤ers from a large enough quality gap that the South willingly o¤ers patent protection in order to induce the patent-holder to sell locally. Thus, the South is coerced to o¤er patent protection only when > S (i.e. regions C11 and C2 in Figure 4 ). Suppose this inequality holds. Then, forcing the South to implement patent protection converts the local market from a competitive imitative industry selling the low quality product to one where the patent-holder sells the high quality at its optimal monopoly price. This switch bene…ts the patent-holder at the expense of the South (who does not …nd it worthwhile to o¤er such protection due to the relatively small quality gap between the patented and the imitated product). Furthermore, this switch also increases joint welfare for ' 2 [' I ; ' Figure 2 ). But for parameters outside these ranges (i.e. in region C2 in Figure 4 ) this change reduces joint welfare.
Finally, over the range where ' < minf' I ; ' E (R)g (i.e. region A2 in Figure 4 ) the patent-holder enters the South regardless of whether or not its patent is protected. Under such a scenario, shutting down local imitation hurts the South because it reduces competition as well variety in the local market. For the same reasons, joint welfare declines. Of course, the patent-holder bene…ts from these changes.
[ Figure 4 here] We summarize this discussion below:
Proposition 5: Requiring the South to o¤er patent protection bene…ts the patentholder at the expense of the South. In addition, it has the following e¤ects:
(i) If ' > maxf' E (R); ' I g, imitation is replaced by CL and joint welfare of the two parties declines.
(ii) If ' E (R) < ' < ' I , CL replaces a market structure where the patent-holder competes with the imitative industry and joint welfare declines.
(iii) Over the range ' I < ' < ' E (R), when > S , the low quality Southern imitative industry is replaced by the high quality patent-holder and joint welfare increases i¤ ' 2 [' I ; ' 
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(iv) For ' < minf' E (R); ' I g, joint welfare declines because competition from the imitative industry is eliminated.
An important insight provided by Proposition 5 is that when forced to o¤er patent protection, the South turns towards CL as a means for securing the product at a low price. Indeed, recall that when imitation is possible, CL does not even arise in equilibrium since, from the Southern viewpoint, it is dominated by imitation. Thus even though CL predates the TRIPS agreement, our model shows that one should expect it to be observed more frequently during the post TRIPS era during which member countries of the WTO have had to clamp down on imitation.
In light of Proposition 5, it is worth asking how the option to use CL a¤ects the two parties when the South can no longer avail of imitation. For ' ' E (R), the patentholder enters with and without CL so neither party if a¤ected. For ' 2 (' E (R); ' E ] the possibility of CL induces the patent-holder to stay out of the market in order to collect 19 The two parties are una¤ected if S since the South willingly o¤ers patent protection and the patent-holder chooses to enter. royalty payments under CL. While the patent-holder necessarily gains from this switch, the South is better o¤ i¤
which is the same as
where = 1 + 8R q > 1 and = 1+ < 1. Note that > 1 because CL involves delay (captured by ) as well as royalty payments -both of which are absent under imitation. Finally, for ' ' E (R), the patent-holder enters whether or not CL is an available option for the South. Of course, for S CL , the South is actually better o¤ under CL but the patent-holder preempts it by entering. We can now state:
Proposition 6: Given that the South o¤ers patent protection, the option of using CL has the following e¤ects:
(i) For ' ' E (R), entry occurs whether or not the South can use CL. However, for S CL the South is better o¤ with CL but the patent-holder preempts it via entry. (ii) When ' 2 (' E (R); ' E ], the patent-holder chooses to stay out and wait for CL. If < S CL the patent-holder gains while the South loses; otherwise, both parties gain. (iii) For ' > ' E (R), the option of CL bene…ts both parties.
In part (i), when S CL the South has su¢ cient technological capability that it is better o¤ producing the product under CL but the patent-holder's entry costs are low enough that it chooses to enter thereby precluding CL. In part (ii), the possibility of CL can hurt the South when its technological capability is relatively weak (i.e. < S CL ) but the costs of entry are high enough for the patent-holder to prefer royalty payments under CL to entry. Figure 5 illustrates how the option of CL a¤ects the two parties given that the South o¤ers patent protection.
[ Figure 5 here] Since the interests of the two parties can con ‡ict, it is worth asking when CL yields higher joint welfare than entry. We have:
Our analysis has shown that the desirability of the CL option hinges very much on whether or not the South is free to deny patent protection. When the South can do so, CL is essentially counter-productive -not only does it not arise in equilibrium, but the option to use it makes both parties worse o¤; when South must o¤er patent protection, CL can play a much more useful role and can even make both parties better o¤.
Thus far, our analysis has assumed that the patent-holder is free to charge its optimal monopoly price p m when selling in the South. We now extend our analysis to the scenario where the price under entry is negotiated between the patent-holder and the South.
Entry with price negotiations
So far it has been assumed above that if the …rm chooses to enter the South market, it sets the pro…t-maximizing price in each period. However, as noted in the Introduction, entry by patent-holders in developing countries is often associated with price negotiations. 20 Therefore, we conclude by extending the model to allow for price negotiations between the Southern government and the patent-holder.
Price negotiations without CL
We begin by analyzing a two stage game in which the South does not have the option of issuing a compulsory license. In the …rst stage, the South chooses whether or not to o¤er patent protection. In the second stage the South negotiates with the patent holder over the price of the product if the patent-holder wishes to enter. The set of feasible prices for this bargaining problem results in a concave payo¤ frontier re ‡ecting payo¤s to the respective parties as a function of the negotiated price. Rather than assuming a speci…c bargaining protocol for these price negotiations, we illustrate the impact of negotiations on the South's incentive for patent protection by comparing the case where the patent holder achieves its most preferred outcome on the frontier (i.e. the case considered thus far in the paper) with that when the South achieves its best outcome.
If the South chooses to grant patent protection, the minimum price at which the patent holder will enter the market is the solution to 20 In Bond and Saggi (2014b) we analyze a …nite-horizon alternating o¤ers game in which the patentholder bargains with the South over the local price of its patented good. The focus of that paper is on how the presence of international price spillovers (between the South and the patent-holder's home market) and the threat of CL alter the equilibrium of the bargaining game.
Observe that p min E (') is increasing in ', and equals the optimal monopoly price p m at the highest level of …xed cost at which the patent-holder is willing to enter: i.e. p min
Recall that the payo¤ to the South from entry at price p equals
which is monotonically decreasing in p over [0; q):
Given patent protection, the set of prices that is consistent with entry and is not Pareto dominated is given by the interval [p min E ('); p m ]. For ' < ' E , the patent holder and the South negotiate over the range of feasible prices [p min E ('); p m ], which generates a strictly concave payo¤ frontier. 21 The analysis of the previous sections, in which the patent-holder sets the monopoly price p m , is the outcome when the patent-holder has all of the bargaining power, as when it can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the South. If on the other hand the South has all of the bargaining power (i.e. it makes a take or leave it o¤er to the patent-holder), the outcome will be the minimum price p min E ('): In general, depending upon the allocation of bargaining power between the two parties, price negotiations yield a price p
Now consider price negotiations in the absence of patent protection. Without patent protection, the minimum price at which the patent holder would enter is 
This frontier is strictly concave in w S , and is downward sloping for w S w E (p m ). The maximum payo¤ that the South can obtain is w E (p min E (')), in which case the patent holder's net return is driven to 0. feasible agreement exists for ' > ' I , so the range of …xed costs for which entry will occur is the same as in the case without price negotiation. Thus, the lack of patent protection reduces the likelihood of entry occurs even in the presence of price negotiations.
We are now ready to derive the South's optimal patent policy in the presence of price negotiations. It is clear that the South does not o¤er patent protection if ' > ' E and negotiations yield a price p ; ' E ); the patent holder does not enter in the absence of patent protection. Over this range of …xed costs, the South must choose between implementing patent protection to induce entry at price p B E (') or allowing imitation to make only the imitated product available to consumers at zero price. Thus, for ' 2 [' I ; ' E ), patent protection is preferred by the South i¤
which is the same as p
Since
, price negotiations expand the range of for which the South prefers patent protection provided the South has some degree of bargaining power. If the South has all of the bargaining power then p B E (') = p min E (') and inequality (17) can be written as
where
Now consider the range ' 2 [0; ' I ]. Recall that here the patent holder's …xed costs are su¢ ciently low that it would choose to enter even without patent protection if it can charge its pro…t-maximizing price p m I . However, when price is negotiated the patentholder's can only charge p B E (') when it has patent protection and p B I ('; ) when it does not. The South will prefer providing patent protection if the consumer surplus it obtains from the patented product at price p B E (') exceeds that obtained from having both the patented product at price p B I ('; ) and the imitated product at zero price. Since the absence of patent protection provides the option of buying the low quality product from imitators, a necessary condition for the South to prefer patent protection is that it be able to negotiate a lower price with patent protection than without, i.e., it must be that p B I ('; ) > p B E ('). Otherwise, lack of patent protection is strictly preferable from the South's viewpoint: not only does it yield the high quality product at a lower price (since p B I ('; ) < p B E (')) it also provides consumers access to the low quality product at zero price.
Recall that if the patent-holder has all the bargaining power, patent protection necessarily raises the local price of the high quality product (since p m I < p m ) and the South therefore chooses not to implement patent protection for all ' ' I as established in Proposition 1. However, as noted above, if the South has all the bargaining power, the negotiated price in the absence of patent protection exceeds that under patent protection (i.e. p min I ('; ) > p min E (') for > 0). It is shown in the Appendix that when the South has all the bargaining power, for all ' < ' I , the negotiated price under patent protection is su¢ ciently low relative to when such protection is absent that the South is better o¤ providing protection.
We can now state our main result for the case where the South has all the bargaining power:
Proposition 7: Suppose that the South can make a take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er for the patented product and compulsory licensing is not an option. Then, the South provides patent protection if (i) S and ' < ' E or (ii) > S and ' < ' B ( )
Furthermore, the market outcome where the patent-holder competes with the imitative industry does not arise in equilibrium.
To isolate the e¤ect price negotiations have on the South's incentive for patent protection, it is useful to compare the case where all the bargaining power lies with patentholder (as is true in our core model) to one where it lies with the South. Proposition 1 describes the South's equilibrium policy in the former case while Proposition 7 does so for the latter case. A comparison of Propositions 1 and 7 illustrates that the South's ability to drive the patent holder to its minimum acceptable price can enter signi…cantly expands the parameter region over which it chooses to provide patent protection. When the patent-holder unilaterally sets the price, the South's decision regarding patent protection is determined solely by the quality gap parameter whereas when the South controls the price, both the quality gap and the …xed cost of entry ' matter. In particular, the South o¤ers patent protection over the second region speci…ed in Proposition 7 (i.e. > S and ' < ' B ( )) only when it can get the patent-holder to sell at its minimum acceptable price. When all of the bargaining power resides with the South, price negotiations drive the patent-holder's net pro…ts down to zero both with and without patent protection. Thus, while the patent-holder is indi¤erent to patent protection, the South has greater tolerance for it because the minimum price needed to induce entry is higher in its absence: i.e. p [ Figure 6 here]
In Figure 6 , the South has all the bargaining power and it o¤ers patent protection over regions A, B, and C1. This contrasts with the case where the patent holder has all of the bargaining power, which results in patent protection being provided by the South only over region B.
Price negotiations with CL
We now extend the bargaining game to the case in which the South has the option of issuing a compulsory license if no agreement is reached after the …rst period. For the case where the South does not provide patent protection, the possibility of CL has no bearing on price negotiations between the South and the patent-holder. Due to the presence of imitators, the South can obtain a product that is equivalent to that under CL without delay and without the necessity of paying royalties when there is no patent protection. Therefore, in what follows, we need to only consider price negotiations for the case where the South o¤ers patent protection.
When CL is an option, the patent-holder enters only if it earns a return of at least '+ R from sales in the South market. From (15) , the minimum price the patent-holder is willing to accept when it has patent protection is p min E (' + R). Since p min E (' + R) is increasing in R, the possibility of CL raises the minimum price that the South must pay to induce entry.
The existence of CL also a¤ects the maximum price that the South is willing to pay under patent protection, since it can ensure itself a surplus of w 
which yields
Observe that p max E ( ; R) is decreasing in and increasing in R, because CL is more attractive to the South the greater is the quality of the imitated product and the lower is the royalty rate under CL. Thus, when CL is an available option, the patent-holder and the South negotiate over prices that lie in the interval [p
We begin with the case where the patent holder has all of the bargaining power. It is clear that the patent-holder will make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of minfp max E ( ; R); p m g. The South is willing to accept the patent-holder's optimal price (i.e. p max E ( ; R) p m ) i¤ S CL = S where > 1. When > S CL , the patent-holder has to o¤er p max (which is lower than p m ) for the South to prefer entry to CL since the quality of production under CL is fairly high and the South is better o¤ waiting to issue a compulsory license rather than paying the price p m to induce entry. When > S CL , the patent-holder's payo¤ from entry at the price p max E ( ; R) is given by
The patent-holder is willing to o¤er the price p max E ( ; R) i¤ it yields a higher payo¤ than CL, i.e., A comparison of Propositions 6 and 8 (and Figures 5 and 7) provides three important insights. When the quality of imitation and the costs of entry are both quite low ( S CL and ' ' E (R)), price negotiations do not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome and therefore the welfare of either party. But if the quality of imitation is not too low and the cost of entry is of intermediate magnitude, the patent-holder is forced to lower its price from p m to p max E ( ; R). This price reduction under entry bene…ts the South at the expense of the patent-holder while also increasing total welfare. Third, price negotiations expand the parameter range over which CL occurs: in particular, for ' 2 [' B m ( ; R); ' E (R)], in the absence of price negotiations the patent-holder sells at its optimal monopoly price p m whereas the South would rather have CL but is unable to implement it since the patent-holder preempts it.
It is noteworthy that for ' 2 [' B m ( ; R); ' E (R)] even though the bargaining power lies entirely in the hands of the patent-holder, price negotiations bene…t the South by making it possible for it to refuse a price o¤er that drives its welfare below that under CL. The e¤ect of this change in the market outcome on joint welfare is ambiguous: CL yields a lower price relative to entry but also lowers quality while delaying the introduction of the product to the South.
We are now in a position to consider how the availability of CL a¤ects incentives for patent protection when the bargaining power during price negotiations lies entirely in the hands of the patent-holder. Price negotiations lower the price at which the product is available under entry while also ensuring that the patent-holder cannot preempt CL since the terms of its entry become subject to the approval of the South. Exactly for the same reasons, the attractiveness of entry relative to CL decreases in the eyes of the patent-holder since its payo¤ under CL (i.e. R) is una¤ected by price negotiations. As a result, the patent-holder is more willing to stay out of the South and wait for CL. Note, however, that price negotiations do not a¤ect Southern welfare under CL and therefore CL continues to be dominated by imitation from the perspective of the South. Furthermore, Southern welfare under entry at price p max E ( ; R) equals that under CL. As a result, the South's equilibrium patent policy is not a¤ected by price negotiations (i.e. is the same as that given in Proposition 3) when the patent-holder has all the bargaining power.
We now brie ‡y discuss the case where the South has all of the bargaining power. Here, for ' ' E (R) the South can induce entry by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er of p min E (' + R) to the patent-holder. Since the existence of the CL raises the price that the South must pay to the patent holder, the higher the royalty rate under CL the less desirable is patent protection from the South's perspective. The payo¤ to the South under patent protection is greater than that without if
This inequality binds at the critical value of the …xed cost below which the South implements patent protection to induce entry:
Observe that ' B ( ; R) < ' B ( ) for all R > 0.
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 8 , the availability of CL reduces South's incentive for patent protection when it has all the bargaining power during price negotiations. Over regions C21 and C31, the South o¤ers patent protection only when it does not have the option of CL. Thus, the basic message of Proposition 3 (i.e. the option to use CL weakens the South's incentive for patent protection) continues to hold when the South can make a take-it-or leave-it price o¤er to the patent-holder.
[ Figure 8 here] Finally, note that for ' < ' I , the South's decision not o¤er patent protection is una¤ected by the possibility of CL because it has no e¤ect on the bargaining problem.
Conclusion
TRIPS ‡exibilities such as compulsory licensing are intended to provide member countries of the WTO with a safety valve when domestic considerations make it imperative to opt out of TRIPS obligations. While CL predates TRIPS, developing countries had little use for it when they were free to deny patent protection to foreign …rms. During the pre-TRIPS era, imitation and reverse-engineering allowed developing countries with adequate technological capability to obtain cheap access to pharmaceuticals that were patented in the rest of the world. Even those developing countries that lacked the ability to produce pharmaceuticals domestically were able to import them from countries such as India and China. But with the rati…cation of TRIPS, developing countries have come under increasing pressure to o¤er and enforce patent protection at a level that is on par with the Western world. As a result, during the post-TRIPS era CL has the potential to become an important policy tool using which developing countries can provide local consumers access to patented pharmaceuticals at reasonable prices provided its use is not met with serious resistance from developed countries.
We construct a stylized model in which a developing country (South) chooses its patent protection policy taking into account the e¤ect of its policy on the incentive of a patent-holder to sell in its market. As per TRIPS rules, we assume that the South has the option to issue a compulsory license to a local …rm only if the patent-holder chooses not to work its patent locally. Our analysis provides several interesting insights. First, we …nd that the South has an incentive to o¤er patent protection if and only if it is necessary for inducing the patent-holder to serve its market and the quality of the imitated local product is su¢ ciently low. Second, from the Southern perspective, TRIPS consistent CL is a poor substitute for imitation: not only does it involve a waiting period (during which the patent-holder is given an opportunity to work its patent), it also requires royalties to be paid to the patent-holder. Third, from the perspective of joint welfare, the desirability of CL hinges very much on whether or not the South has the freedom to deny patent protection. When the South has such policy freedom, CL is essentially counter-productive: not only does it not arise in equilibrium, but the option to use it results in a Pareto inferior outcome. On the other hand, when the South has no choice but to o¤er patent protection (as is basically true today for all members of the WTO), CL plays a much more useful role: not only does it arise in equilibrium, it can even generate a Pareto improving outcome. This result argues in favor of Article 31 of TRIPS under which CL is sanctioned by the WTO.
We also extend the basic model to the case where the patent holder and the South bargain over the price. We show that patent protection becomes more likely when the South can negotiate a price below the optimal monopoly price. This e¤ect arises in two ways. First, if the patent-holder would not enter in the absence of patent protection, the ability to obtain the higher quality product at a lower price makes entry more attractive to the South than relying on the low quality imitated product. Second, when the South makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the patent-holder, it has an incentive to o¤er patent protection even if the patent-holder is willing to enter without it. This is due to the fact that the price needed to induce entry is higher under imitation because competition from imitators reduces the patent-holder's sales in the South. This adverse e¤ect of imitation on the price required to induce entry dominates the bene…t of making the low quality product available to local consumers. Finally, we also show that the ability to issue a compulsory license undermines the South's incentive to o¤er patent protection when price is negotiated, just as it does in the absence of price negotiations. 
